Regulating Online Privacy:  Some Policy Guidelines, Including Guidelines for International Harmonization by Clemons, Eric K & Banattar, Jordyn
Regulating Online Privacy:  Some Policy Guidelines, Including 
Guidelines for International Harmonization 
Eric K. Clemons 
The Wharton School 
clemons@upenn.edu 
 
Jordyn Benattar 
The Rotman School 
jordyn.benattar@mail.utoronto.ca 
Abstract 
With dramatic changes in technology capabilities, 
much of current privacy law in the US and abroad has 
been rendered out of date.  Analogies and precedents 
are difficult to interpret, leading to decisions that are 
inconsistent, problematic, or wrong.  Searching the 
text messages on an iPhone is not the same as over-
hearing a conversation.  Searching an entire Face-
book account for evidence of fraud is not the same as 
searching a bank account.  We review the lessons of 
four current court cases involving online privacy and 
develop a set of guidelines that could be used to de-
velop coherent privacy policy.  The guidelines were 
developed with the expectation that they could confer 
no advantage on firms in nation, and that they would 
provide all citizens with the privacy protections no 
less than those they enjoy in their home countries. 
1. Introduction to the Problems in Regulating 
Online Privacy 
Technological innovations are occurring at an unprec-
edented rate.  These innovations expand the capabili-
ties of individuals and legitimate businesses.  They 
also expand the capabilities of terrorists, terrorist cells, 
and criminal organizations.  And they expand the ca-
pabilities of governments, both friendly and hostile, 
foreign and domestic.  This alters the nature of threats 
we all face, as well as the need for speed to detect and 
prevent them.  Augmented capabilities and changing 
nature of threats requires a coherent response in public 
policy, regulation, and law.  This coherent response 
must be agreed both at home and abroad, and coordi-
nated with both foreign and domestic governmental 
agencies.  This challenges traditional regulatory 
frameworks and limits the applicability of historical 
analogies and legal precedents. 
The United States needs a new and clear privacy 
policy based on current technological capabilities, 
current needs for legal protection, and current business 
models and business practices.  We need a privacy 
policy based on the business environment as it exists 
today and as it is likely to develop in the foreseeable 
future.  A privacy policy based on historical prece-
dents and imprecise analogies will lead to legal deci-
sions that are poor and are inconsistent across jurisdic-
tions domestically and internationally.  These deci-
sions will be based on the idiosyncratic selection of 
examples and analogies offered in each dispute, and 
on the responses of individual courts.  
We need a clear new privacy policy, to protect in-
dividuals, to guide the courts, and as importantly to 
protect American corporations and guide their strate-
gic planning efforts by removing an enormous source 
of uncertainty.  Privacy policy has multiple objectives, 
which sometimes conflict with each other.  Making it 
harder for governments to “crack” encryption protects 
individual privacy by making arbitrary search by gov-
ernmental agencies more difficult.  However, this also 
makes it more difficult for governments to detect and 
monitor terrorist activities and thus makes it more 
difficult to prevent terrorist attacks.    
Moreover, we need a clear new privacy policy 
that is harmonized globally.  There are many reasons 
why global harmonization is required.  Individuals 
need to understand their rights and the protections 
available to them both at home and abroad.  American 
corporations should not placed at a competitive disad-
vantage by the US imposing more stringent require-
ments on data sharing with law enforcement and gov-
ernment agencies than those that are imposed on for-
eign corporations.  European corporations should not 
placed at a competitive disadvantage as a result of 
unequal enforcement of privacy laws, which allows 
American firms to operate in Europe in ways that are 
both spectacularly profitable and illegal for European 
corporations. 
We begin by explaining why it is necessary to 
change our regulatory regime.  Section 2 explains the 
importance of a new policy based on current techno-
logical capabilities, since existing regulations do not 
address contemporary business practices.  Section 3 
lists the objectives that we believe should guide the 
redesign of domestic American regulation.  Section 4 
explains that the problem is not new; regulatory 
change frequently lags technologic evolution.  Section 
5 reviews why this truly is a problem, by exploring the 
difficulties encountered when using historical prece-
dent to resolve conflicts in the use of modern technol-
ogy.  Section 6 reviews The Big Four in current priva-
cy litigation, cases involving Apple, Microsoft, 
Google, and Facebook, which are without a doubt the 
four largest providers of online software in the west-
ern world.  Section 7 provides some guidelines for 
developing new privacy policy, while section 8 pro-
vides our suggested policy.  Finally, section 9 pro-
vides brief conclusions. 
2. The Importance of a Clear New Policy Based 
on Current Technological Capabilities and 
Current Business Practices 
Whenever possible regulation should be based on his-
torical precedents.  American jurisprudence is based 
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on constant evolution, as new situations arise, new 
business practices arise, and new sources of conflict 
and litigation arise.  Historical precedent does not pre-
vent evolution, but it places clear and deliberate limits 
on the pace of change, providing stability, predictabil-
ity, and in most cases fairness. 
However, discontinuous change in technological 
capabilities and in the business practices that they 
enable do, indeed, create discontinuous changes.  We 
start by using well-known examples not selected from 
the privacy domain.  None were anticipated when the 
original regulations were drafted, and, similarly, all 
entail possibilities that were not envisioned and were 
not relevant during the litigation of prior cases.  Some 
practices that might have been deemed as abusive in 
earlier cases may not be abusive today.  When there 
were only three television networks, and a region 
might have access to at most three stations, the Fair-
ness Doctrine [10] was essential to ensuring that all 
citizens had access to sufficient sources of infor-
mation.  With literally hundreds of broadcast and 
online sources of information today, the Fairness Doc-
trine is no longer as critical.  In contrast, the First 
Amendment to the American Constitution [12], per-
haps the most important of the amendments in the Bill 
of Rights, places virtually no restrictions on freedom 
of speech.  The Founding Fathers, the drafters of the 
American Constitution, were concerned with the ease 
with which a government might silence all opposition 
by seizing printing presses.  They did not envision the 
ease with which illegitimate voices, including agents 
of foreign powers, might flood the US with online 
fake news.  Nor did they anticipate the speed with 
which fake news from legitimate American sources 
might be picked up and amplified, and used to distort 
elections or to deliberately misinform the public.  Ly-
ing for political advantage is not new.  But the speed 
with which technology can spread and amplify lies is 
unprecedented.  
Discontinuous change in business practices has 
always resulting in discontinuous change in regula-
tion.  Small local proprietors could not influence the 
supply or prices of most goods, and the invisible hand 
of the market was quite sufficient to ensure efficient 
operation, and to regulate supply and prices of both 
goods and labor.  In contrast, when the industrial revo-
lution facilitated the emergence of massive vertically 
and horizontally integrated corporations, antimonopo-
ly laws and antitrust laws become essential to protect 
both consumers and the competitive environment.  
Small local producers sold their goods to their neigh-
bors.  Defective products, and most importantly, dan-
gerous and unwholesome products, were more readily 
detected, despite legends such as the tale of Sweeney 
Todd.  Mostly, you could not get away with selling 
spoiled meats or contaminated milk to your neighbors.  
Massive industrial manufacturing facilities, selling to 
communities hundreds, or even thousands of miles 
away, required inspection, resulting in the creation of 
the Food and Drug Administration in 1906 [13].  Ad-
ditionally, small local producers sold their goods to 
their neighbors, and deceptive advertising and decep-
tive trade practices were readily detected.  In contrast, 
broadcast advertising created new opportunities for 
deceptive claims, resulting in the creation of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission in 1914 [11]. 
Technology has created situations that never ex-
isted before, creating legal paradoxes that never exist-
ed before.  Current law prohibits mail carriers from 
reading the contents of first class mail, and current 
practice prohibits common carriers like Federal Ex-
press and DHL from opening sealed communications.  
In contrast, there are few legal restrictions what 
Google or other email service providers can do with 
the contents of private messages that they deliver.  
Moreover, the regulation of these paradoxes is not 
consistent and is not always in the best interests of 
consumers.  The Japanese Constitution protects con-
sumers from their telecommunications providers per-
forming any form of data mining on the content of the 
users’ communications.  There were no such re-
strictions on Google as an email provider or search 
provider, because when the Japanese Constitution was 
drafted after World War II neither email nor online 
search was anticipated as potential threats to individu-
al privacy.  Decades later Google was of course un-
regulated in Japan.  Yahoo!, which was owned by a 
company that also provided wireless telecommunica-
tions services, had numerous restrictions on how it 
could use its users’ content for commercial purposes.  
Rather than restrict Google to bring it in line with the 
intent of the framers of the Japanese Constitution, the 
restrictions of Yahoo!’s owner, Softbank, were 
dropped.  It is hard to imagine how this could be best 
for Japanese consumers [36, 39].  
It is also clear that current technology has created 
threats to privacy of a scale that has never existed be-
fore.  It is clear that online data integrators have pre-
pared more complete profiles on individual consum-
ers, their expected cost to serve, their expected will-
ingness to pay, and all aspects of their purchasing be-
havior [14, 21, 41].  It has been shown by Ben Shiller 
[35] and others that this information has now starting 
to be used to increase the prices charged to specific, 
identifiable, individual consumers. 
Moreover, the legal remedies that have been of-
fered do not address the problems of informed differ-
ential pricing adequately. The Electronic Communica-
tions Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986 was intended to 
provide the same degree of privacy protection for 
email and other forms of electronic communications 
that already existed to protect privacy from wiretap-
ping [8].  Unfortunately, voice communications are 
transient; you say something, and if it has not illegally 
been recorded it is gone.  In contrast, email can remain 
in storage indefinitely.  In the more than 40 years 
since the act was drafted, our use of email has 
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use of telephony, nor is it analogous to our use of tra-
ditional mail.  The bill is seriously outmoded [1, 11].  
Many of the disputes that we discuss in section 6 are 
in large measure based on different interpretations of 
the ECPA.  The digital right to be forgotten online has 
been suggested as a mechanism to protect consumers 
from the negative impacts of data mining and from the 
negative impacts of inaccurate or irrelevant infor-
mation [32].  Some form of the right to be forgotten 
has already been introduced in the EU and South Ko-
rea, and several other jurisdictions are considering 
introducing additional measures.  While the right to be 
forgotten does allow individuals to delete links to in-
formation stored online, so that they do not appear in 
search results, the original articles still remain acces-
sible on the net.  More relevant to the issue we are 
discussing here, data warehousing does not involve 
doing a search for archival information.  Rather, it 
involves tracking your transactions, in real time, as 
they occur, and integrating them across the broadest 
possible range of sources.  Removing links to one or 
two articles will have no impact whatsoever on data 
mining, data integration, and data warehousing.  It 
will have no impact on privacy violations, or on the 
financial costs associated with precision pricing ena-
bled by privacy violations. 
The capabilities of data analysis, especially ma-
chine learning and big data analytics, are barely un-
derstood by experts today.  They clearly were never 
anticipated by prior legal scholars and they clearly are 
not covered by historical legal precedent.  Analysis of 
Facebook “likes” has been shown to be sufficient to 
infer vast amounts of information with a surprisingly 
high degree of accuracy, including assessing personal-
ity traits [22, 27], and the ability to determine birth 
gender and sexual orientation, religion, and political 
affiliation.  Similar uses have been found for other 
sources of public information, even of the photo you 
select for your Facebook wall.  This can be combined 
with data warehousing and used in an ever-increasing 
variety of ways.  Not all of the uses are beneficial to 
consumers.  Documented commercial uses include 
discriminating against renters based on race or reli-
gion, discriminating in coverage availability or prices 
for insurance applicants, and precision targeted mar-
keting to children [6, 7, 30, 40].  Equally troublesome 
is the potential for election manipulation, as indicated 
by recent experience with the Brexit campaign and 
with Trump’s recent presidential campaign [3, 37]. 
Most current corporate practices that address pri-
vacy are based on outmoded regulations, and when 
modern corporate strategy and online business models 
are regulated by rules developed in the 1960s or 1980s 
the results are less than ideal for consumers.  Attempts 
to regulate one corporation by analogy with another in 
a different industry, or with a regulatory policy de-
signed for a different era, are unpredictable.  Google is 
permitted to read email, in ways that no carrier of tra-
ditional mail would be permitted.  Google is permitted 
to view your purchase history and use it commercial-
ly, in ways that no credit card issuer or financial ser-
vices firm would be permitted to do.  Google and Ub-
er are permitted to monitor your geographic position 
constantly, with persistence that would not be permit-
ted for any employer, and indeed would not be permit-
ted for law enforcement agencies without a court-
ordered tracking device.  And yet each of the exam-
ples involves firms with only a limited slice of the 
data available on any one of us.  Moreover, each of 
these firms has a sound business reason for wanting 
the data they are gathering.  Google does not charge 
consumers for services they provide, and their use of 
private information they capture is the basis of the 
bulk of their profits.  Uber could not predict demand 
as well, and could not dispatch cars as quickly, if it 
did not know the location of its passengers.  In con-
trast, local internet service providers (ISPs) are now 
permitted to view, store and analyze any and all data 
that they transmit and to use it for commercial purpos-
es, as a result of recent bill passed by the US Congress 
[15].  In theory, without clarification and without 
modification, this bill would allow your ISP to com-
bine financial services data, texting and email, trans-
mission of documents and photographs for storage in 
the cloud, search history, and medical records sent to 
you through secure portals, to create a portrait of you 
in unlimited detail.  This is permitted, despite the fact 
that it is far broader than the data available to any oth-
er commercial enterprise.  This is permitted despite 
the fact that your ISPs have numerous other sources of 
revenues and of profits.  Google is not the right corpo-
rate analog for regulating Comcast and Verizon as 
ISPs.   
3. Objectives of American Regulation 
We see at least six objectives for privacy regulation in 
the United States.  Each objective seeks to protect a 
different constituency. 
Protecting the privacy of our citizens as guar-
anteed by the Fourth Amendment to the US Con-
stitution, prohibiting illegal search and seizure.  
The Fourth Amendment guarantees that in their homes 
Americans are safe from search and seizure of proper-
ty by the federal government, unless the government 
can show cause and can obtain a valid search warrant.  
By extension this now applies to search and seizure by 
state and local governments.  Government surveil-
lance of our online activities should be governed by 
the same rules that govern search of our physical 
property, our mail, and our traditional telephony. 
Protecting our citizens by apprehending and 
convicting traditional criminals. The need to re-
spond immediately to perceived terrorist threats may 
sometimes require that the courts provide sweeping 
investigatory powers, including electronic surveillance 
of a suspect, all of his electronic communications, and 
the electronic communications of all of his or her con-
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Protect the privacy of our citizens by not set-
ting precedents that place them at risk from illegal 
search by foreign governments.  If the access that 
the US government demands from US online service 
providers are too great, this may create precedents that 
can and will be used by foreign governments to de-
mand corporate cooperation with their own surveil-
lance activities.  If the US can force an American 
company to violate the norms of the countries in 
which it operates and to provide data on foreign na-
tionals in order to obey the wishes of the US govern-
ment, does this set precedents for foreign governments 
to demand similar concessions when investigating US 
citizens? 
Protecting the state from the activities of ter-
rorists and enemies, foreign and domestic. Some-
times the US will need to access data quickly to pre-
vent a terrorist attack, or to prevent the destruction of 
evidence related to a past or planned future attack.  
While suspected terrorists have rights in the US, for 
example if they are US citizens, the courts should be 
prepared to provide access to critical information al-
most immediately. 
Protecting the interests of American corpora-
tions by not placing them at a strategic disad-
vantage relative to foreign competitors.  If Mi-
crosoft and Google email accounts are seen as unsafe 
for foreign nationals, this will accelerate the growth of 
non-US competitors, including those who would not 
normally be able to compete with Microsoft and 
Google either in terms of price of services or in terms 
of service quality.  Given the importance of high tech 
service providers to the US economy and to the US 
balance of trade, actions that increase the attractive-
ness of foreign competitors can hardly be seen as in 
the best interests of the US.  Facebook is thriving in 
the EU despite repeatedly violating EU privacy poli-
cies. If these consistent privacy violations were seen 
as somehow supporting activities of the US govern-
ment it is not clear that the population of the EU na-
tions would be as tolerant of them.  This one of the 
few scenarios that could lead to replacing Facebook in 
Europe with one or more local and locally regulated 
alternatives. 
Protecting the privacy of foreign nationals 
from illegal search and seizure enabled by prece-
dents established by US law enforcement.  If the US 
can demand access to data on US citizens, regardless 
of where the data are located, and irrespective of the 
local policies on search and privacy in the countries 
where the data are located, then foreign governments 
can do the same.  A citizen who resides in the US and 
uses US software providers might previously have felt 
secure from illegal search and seizure.  However, if 
the US can demand that service providers deliver in-
formation on its citizens regardless of where they or 
their data reside, presumably any other nation could 
do the same. 
4. The Problem Drafting Appropriate Regulation 
Is Not New — Regulation Frequently Lags 
Technological Innovation 
Technological innovation has frequently demanded a 
reexamination of privacy policies, and of regulation 
more generally. 
American jurisprudence is based on historical 
precedent and analogy, as well as law.  That is, prece-
dent and analogy go a long way towards governing the 
interpretation of law.  But analogies are imprecise, and 
on occasion can lead to absurd decisions when using 
them to interpret the application of old law to new 
technologies.  
It is generally accepted in American courts that no 
warrant is needed when overhearing unguarded speech 
over a cellphone.  If a suspect says something out 
loud, in public, in the presence of a police officer then 
no warrant is required to “capture” that speech as evi-
dence.  The State of California tried to argue, in Riley 
v. California, [33], that by analogy the police did not 
require a warrant to view the text on a suspect’s cell-
phone during an arrest.  Ultimately, after rounds of 
appeals, the case was decided by the US Supreme 
Court.  The Court ruled that while a casual observer 
can overhear speech, and there is no presumed right to 
privacy when speaking in public, a casual observer 
cannot read your texting history when you carry your 
phone in public [2, 29].  Thus, a warrant is required to 
search a suspect’s cellphone.  However, while the rul-
ing seems self-evidently correct, this dispute actually 
reached the US Supreme Court before it was resolved.  
Analogies, in the hands of skilled lawyers, are com-
plex things and their interpretation can be unpredicta-
ble.  Regulatory clarification would help make clear 
what analogies are correct and what are not, and 
where precedents are applicable and where they are 
not. 
Problems with applying existing regulations and 
historical precedents to unfamiliar technology are not 
new nor are they restricted to privacy.  The evolution 
of attempts to regulate AT&T over several decades 
provides an instructive early example.  AT&T was a 
natural monopoly, perhaps the first significant natural 
monopoly in business history.  The more people con-
nected to a network the more valuable the network 
becomes; AT&T offered our first example of a posi-
tive participation externality, also called a network 
effect.  Moreover, with the more limited technology of 
the late 1800s and early 1900s, people connected to a 
different network, one not operated by AT&T, could 
not communicate with people on the AT&T network.  
Clearly, the bigger the AT&T network became the 
more valuable it was to AT&T’s customers.  Just as 
clearly, customers who were on competitors’ networks 
could communicate with fewer people, could not 
communicate with the majority of Americans, and 
received less value, even though their services cost as 
much to provide.  Thus, the fewer competitors that 
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were operating in the US, and the more people who 
relied upon AT&T for their telecommunications ser-
vices throughout the US, the better off everyone 
would be.  It was not immediately clear how to deal 
with a natural monopoly.  Natural monopolies were 
not covered adequately by either the Sherman Act 
(which focused on heavy industry) or the Interstate 
Commerce Act (which focused on rail networks rather 
than telecoms networks).  The Sherman Act was in-
tended to prevent abuse caused by huge industrial 
monopolies by limiting their growth and their increase 
in market share.  But with the telecommunications 
technology that existed at the time, communications 
across the boundaries of an individual company was 
impossible.  Hence the US actually needed and want-
ed a telecommunications monopoly.  The Interstate 
Commerce Act was designed to prohibit abuse of 
farmers and rural shippers by prohibiting abusively 
high prices on short haul traffic over monopoly lines; 
a farmer’s cost for the first few miles shipping pro-
duce to Chicago might be as high or higher than the 
cost of shipping it the rest of the distance to New York 
[16].  There is no indication at AT&T was abusing 
local service customers in order to facilitate long dis-
tance communications.  Indeed, AT&T was over-
charging for long distance communications (long 
haul) and undercharging local service customers (short 
haul), the very opposite of the problem that the Inter-
state Commerce Commission was created to address.  
AT&T was subsidizing local subscribers, in order to 
achieve the socially desirable goal of universal ser-
vice, or universal access to the telecommunications 
network.  While it was clearly socially desirable to 
move towards universal service, this, too, grew 
AT&T’s market share and strengthened AT&T’s mo-
nopoly position.  When neither the Sherman Act nor 
the Interstate Commerce Act were appropriate for 
regulating AT&T the Justice Department turned to 
AT&T itself for guidance.  The result was the Kings-
bury Commitment [41] of December, 1913.  This rec-
ognized AT&T’s role as a natural monopoly and in-
deed did nothing to weaken AT&T’s monopoly power 
or reduce its market share.  Instead, the Kingsbury 
Commitment merely required AT&T to divest West-
ern Union (the telegraph company) and required it to 
stop acquiring small local telephone companies; in 
exchange it was given complete control over its opera-
tions, subject only to a constraint on its total profita-
bility.  Unlike the UK, where telephony became a di-
vision of the national postal service, in the US AT&T 
retained its status as a publicly traded company, sub-
ject to rules that limited the financial impact of its 
monopoly power. 
The next question regulators faced, two decades 
later, was how to deal with platform envelopment af-
ter AT&T moved into network broadcasting.  Platform 
envelopment occurs when a company has significant 
power and significant market share and profits from 
one software element, usually an operating system or 
other extensible platform.  Platform envelopment en-
tails integrating a sequence of additional, complemen-
tary software elements.  When the integration is done 
properly, the collection of elements has far more value 
than the sum of the individual values.  Moreover, 
when done properly, the integrated collection cannot 
be duplicated by other vendors because they lack one 
or more critical components, such as Microsoft’s con-
trol over the desktop through Windows, or Google’s 
control over the cellphone desktop through Android.  
The user receives significant benefit, of course, which 
appeals to regulators.  Competitors can be excluded, 
even destroyed, which regulators abhor.  Markets 
alone cannot determine how to restrain platform en-
velopment.  Platform envelopment was not envisioned 
when the Sherman Act was drafted.  When AT&T 
launched America’s first commercial radio station, 
and began to expand it to create America’s first com-
mercial broadcasting network, its control over long 
distance communications would have allowed it to 
block any other commercial broadcasting network.  
This was the eventual justification for the creation of 
the Federal Communications Commission, and for 
forcing AT&T out of network broadcasting [41]. 
5. The Big Four of Current Privacy Cases 
There are four recent cases involving disputes be-
tween the US government, the FBI, the Department of 
Justice, or other law enforcement organizations, and 
the some of the world’s largest and most important 
manufacturers of computer hardware or providers of 
computer software. 
The simplest case to resolve was a dispute be-
tween the Department of Homeland Security and Ap-
ple, over unlocking the iPhones of two dead terrorists.  
A Federal judge in California ordered Apple to help 
the FBI access the contents of San Bernardino shooter 
Syed Farook's iPhone [23].  Apple refused, and their 
CEO Tim Cook vowed to resist the court order [24].  
Attempts to bypass Apple’s security are now risky, 
since the phone automatically erases the phone's data 
after too many unsuccessful attempts to unlock it.  
Clearly the case is complex because of the need to 
balance competing interests; in this case any decision 
would need to balance protecting US citizens from 
further terrorist attacks, which might have been immi-
nent, protecting US corporations from the perception 
that their customers’ data are readily available if the 
Courts in the US demand it, and the need to protect 
foreign nationals, whose own privacy might be placed 
at risk by establishing the precedent of letting gov-
ernments demand access to phone data.  Because of 
the threat to US corporations, Google’s CEO publicly 
supported Apple’s position in this case [18].  The case 
was easy to resolve only because the FBI was able to 
find experts who were able to crack the phone for 
them [31].  The dispute between corporate CEOs and 
the FBI attempts to balance the needs of national secu-
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commercially viable practices that protect individual’s 
legitimate need for privacy.  However, since the case 
was never resolved in the courts, no legal precedent 
has been established. 
The dispute between Microsoft and the Depart-
ment of Justice, over searching email stored in Ireland 
using only a US Warrant, is more complex, and in-
deed is still unresolved [4]. The case turned on the 
need for a valid Irish search warrant when searching 
the email of an Irish national drug dealer whose rec-
ords are controlled by Microsoft and stored in Ireland.  
The DoJ argued that it did not matter where the data 
were located, and that as long as Microsoft controlled 
the data, anywhere in the world, it could be compelled 
to produce the data for search.  Microsoft argued that 
although the data were in electronic form, and subject 
to their control, the emails could not be produced 
without a valid Irish search warrant.  In 2016 Mi-
crosoft appealed, arguing that although the data were 
in electronic form, demanding that they be produced 
for US inspection was entirely analogous to the courts 
attempting to search a customer’s paper files stored in 
a Citibank safety deposit box in Ireland with nothing 
but a US warrant.  The 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals 
decided that if the data were in Ireland, an Irish search 
warrant was necessary.  More recently, the same court 
rejected a request from the Department of Justice for 
an en banc rehearing of the case [“2nd Circuit denies 
rehearing in Microsoft Ireland case by an evenly di-
vided vote [19].  Once again, the decision balanced an 
individual’s rights to privacy, the US legal system’s 
rights to fully informed prosecution, the competitive 
positioning of US information service providers, and 
the implications for foreign nationals.  Since the US 
Department of Justice plans to appeal this case to the 
US Supreme Court, it has yet net been fully resolved. 
The dispute between Google and the FBI is more 
complicated than the dispute between the Department 
of Justice and Microsoft.  The FBI demanded that 
Google produce a large set of emails, and Google re-
fused to provide some of them, arguing that the data 
might not be stored in the United States at any given 
time and that they could not be compelled to produce 
the emails solely on the basis of a US search warrant.  
They also cited the recent decision of the 2nd Circuit 
Court of Appeals, ruling in favor of Microsoft.  The 
decision reached in the dispute was the opposite of the 
decision in the Microsoft case, and has the potential to 
create a contrasting decision that could limit the ap-
plicability of the Microsoft case.  Magistrate Judge 
Thomas Rueter of The US District Court for the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania used two arguments to 
justify finding a decision counter to the precedent of 
the Microsoft case [20].  
The first argument hinged on the nature of 
Google’s decision on where to store individual email 
messages in the cloud.  It would be difficulty or even 
impossible to determine which valid search warrant or 
warrants are required when searching the email of 
American nationals, accused of crimes committed in 
the US, when even Google does not know where the 
data are stored.  This argument also makes clear that 
storing the data of an Irish national in Ireland is fun-
damentally different from storing the data of a US 
national anywhere and everywhere, and this could be 
done explicitly to make search impossible. 
The second argument appears, on its face, to be 
clearly absurd.  Judge Rueter argued that it does not 
matter how the FBI obtains the emails that it demand-
ed, and it does not matter from where in the world the 
data were obtained, because the data are not going to 
be examined until they reach the US.  There thus 
would be no privacy violation and no illegal search or 
seizure, because the data are not obtained by the FBI 
until they have reached the United States.  Thus by 
definition there is no illegal search because no privacy 
is violated until the data are examined in the US, 
where the warrant is legal. 
Both Google’s argument and the decision of 
Judge Rueter would provide dangerous precedents if 
upheld.  Google’s argument, if accepted, would allow 
software companies to avoid all warrants simply by 
moving data throughout the cloud constantly, so there 
is no single place to search and no warrant or set of 
warrants that would compel the company to submit 
the data that had been demanded.  Judge Rueter’s se-
cond argument, if accepted, would allow US courts to 
perform search and seizure, anywhere in the world, as 
long as the documents were not examined until they 
reached the US, even if these searches were illegal in 
the jurisdictions in which they were performed.  In-
deed, by extension, US agents could seize physical 
documents from a locked deposit bank or safe any-
where in the world, provided they had a warrant in the 
US, and provided no one looked at the documents 
until they had arrived in the US. 
The current litigation involving search of Face-
book data is fundamentally different from the other 
cases, because Facebook’s argument is not that the 
warrant is illegal because of the location of the data 
but because of the scope of the court’s request [28].  
Quoting from the decision, “In July 2013, [New York 
State] Supreme Court issued 381 warrants directed at 
Facebook upon a warrant application by the New 
York County District Attorney's Office that was sup-
ported by an investigator's affidavit. The warrants, …, 
sought subscriber information and content from nu-
merous user accounts … .”    
This was a request for all the data on these 381 
Facebook accounts, including friends lists, photo-
graphs, postings, and virtually all data associated with 
each account.  In general, a search warrant needs to be 
specific about what the object of the search is, and 
what the authorities expect to find.  This request was 
so broad that Facebook felt that it was more like a 
subpoena, a request to produce everything that might 
be relevant.  However, while subpoenas can be chal-
lenged, search warrants cannot.  The article in the Pag 5360
New York Times explains: “But Judge Leslie E. Stein, 
writing for the majority, said state courts had held for 
decades that search warrants issued by judges cannot 
be appealed to a higher court. Instead, they may be 
challenged by a defendant only during a pretrial hear-
ing, as illegal searches.” Since the judge held that 
warrants can’t be appealed, the court therefore did not 
need to rule on Facebook’s central argument, that the 
warrants were so broad that they should have been 
viewed as unconstitutional search. 
Lower courts had argued that “Facebook, as a 
service provider, could not argue the searches were 
unconstitutional on behalf of its clients, any more than 
a landlord could stop the police with a warrant from 
searching a storage facility.  Since the court did not 
rule on Facebook’s argument, this leaves unresolved 
the issue of just how broad and invasive an electronic 
search can be.  Searching an individual’s safety depos-
it box for specific documents can produce at most a 
limited amount of information, which must be covered 
by the warrant to be used as evidence.  Searching an 
individual’s hard drive for specific information, like-
wise falls within the scope traditionally permitted for a 
warrant.  Searching an individual’s Facebook account 
for everything accessible may represent a substantial 
deviation from the scope of traditional warrants.   
Only the Google case and Facebook case appear 
to create interesting and potentially problematic prec-
edent.  Both cases suggest that an update of the 1986 
ECPA may be overdue. 
6. Some Suggested Guidelines for Developing 
New Regulatory Policy 
The most basic principles should govern the de-
velopment of new policy. 
• It should always be possible for the courts, for law 
enforcement, and for national security agencies to 
get data for which there is a valid need, and to ob-
tain it in a timely fashion when necessary to pre-
vent criminal acts or acts of terrorism. 
• Demands for data should always be subject to ap-
propriate review. 
The first suggests that locating data where it can-
not possibly be subject to search with a valid warrant 
cannot be tolerated — e.g., if a service provider lo-
cates data on an artificial island, or in a safe data ha-
ven not subject to any MLATs (Mutual Legal Assis-
tance Treaties), then domestic law applies.  Even here 
there is significant ambiguity.  Whose domestic law 
should apply?  The law of the country in which the 
service provider has its home office?  The law of the 
country in which the service provider contracted with 
the customer?  The law of the customer’s home coun-
try?  Likewise, the first principle suggests that en-
crypting data so that no one, not even the service pro-
vider, can access the data for any reason is a threat 
both to judicial proceedings and to national security.  
This suggests the need to address two separate but 
related concepts, data citizenship and data sovereign-
ty. 
Data citizenship refers to where the data are as-
sumed to reside.  When data are located in a specific 
location for reasons of performance, or to conform to 
national law about the retention of data relevant to a 
country’s citizens, then that is the country of the data’s 
citizenship.  When data are located in no particular 
country and move around within the cloud, or when 
data are located in countries specifically to avoid sur-
veillance, harmonized international standards need to 
be developed to determine whether the data has citi-
zenship, or is in some sense stateless.  Data sovereign-
ty will be the rules governing which states have con-
trol over data that possesses its citizenship, and how to 
govern access to data that is in some sense stateless. 
The second principle suggests that blanket war-
rants for data, without specifying the object of the 
search or the relevance of those objects to specific 
litigation, can only be used in the most restricted of 
cases. 
The next section suggests policy, including some 
rules for harmonization. 
7. Suggested Policy  
There is a small set of actions that could easily be tak-
en by all technology services companies and email 
providers.  These actions would ensure that the out-
come of a case would not be determined by delay 
caused by properly pursuing appropriate venues, 
simply by preserving potentially relevant evidence 
while warrants were pursued.  Thus, no country would 
ever need to argue that in the absence of rapid search, 
including search of questionable legality, necessary 
email evidence would be lost forever.  While this 
would not alter the need for speed in counter-terrorism 
operations, it would essentially nullify the arguments 
used by the Department of Justice in this case.  The 
Congress should pass legislation that would make 
these actions mandatory for all service providers oper-
ating in the United States. 
First, all email service providers around the world 
should be required to maintain backups of all email 
correspondence as soon as they receive a suitable offi-
cial notification of an investigation anywhere in the 
world for which this email is material evidence and an 
official request for assistance in obtaining a valid 
search warrant.  We are aware that backups are usual-
ly available, but this ensures that any email that was 
available at the time of notification would always re-
main available at the time the service provider re-
ceived a valid warrant.  This does not require the ser-
vice providers to respond to a warrant from a foreign 
jurisdiction.  It does require the service provider to 
maintain and protect archival data until such time as 
the case is resolved or the relevant jurisdiction where 
the data resides has issued a warrant.  If such a valid 
warrant is issued, then and only then is the company is 
required to provide the data covered by the warrant.   Page 5361
Global harmonization is essential in regulating 
data services providers, just as it was in regulating 
securities trading, to avoid what well-regulated ex-
changes called “the race to the bottom in securities 
regulation.”  Regulatory harmonization in traditional 
industries likewise ensures that no country’s manufac-
turers or service providers are placed at a disadvantage 
by adhering to stricter rules and so that no country’s 
manufacturers or service providers gain a competitive 
advantage by being held to laxer rules.  Thus, coun-
tries will not be able to compete through regulatory 
laxness.  In the 1980s, during the early days of linked 
securities markets and global securities trading, there 
was considerable concern that competition among 
global trading centers would inevitably lead to compe-
tition to see which market could provide the least re-
strictive trading rules, often called competition 
through regulatory laxness and “a race to the bottom” 
[26].  If international norms in data privacy regulation 
are to be respected, then no nation should provide 
limited oversight simply for competitive advantage for 
its own service providers. 
We need clear and unambiguous rules for estab-
lishing rules data citizenship and data sovereignty.  
Data citizenship tells us where the data resides for 
purposes of control, and data sovereignty tells us who 
determines what rights are allowed when accessing 
the data from anywhere in the world.  Determining 
data citizenship will sometimes be straight-forward.  
When the service provider is located in the same ju-
risdiction as the data and as the data’s owner, then 
unambiguously the data are presumed to have citizen-
ship in that single country.  Data citizenship is some-
times more complex.  When the data and the data’s 
owner are located in the same jurisdiction, but this is 
not the home location of the service provider, where 
should the data be presumed to have citizenship?  By 
analogy with physical documents and physical search, 
we would assume that the data have citizenship in the 
country where they are stored.  Any agent wishing to 
search the data would need to follow the rules of that 
country, again by analogy with physical search.  If a 
German citizen stored documents in an office of an 
American bank located in Germany, a German war-
rant would be required for search, even though the 
data are located with an American firm.  However, 
there will be occasions when, as a result of technical 
design or deliberate policies, data may appear to be 
stateless, as would occur if the data were stored in 
non-geosynchronous near-earth orbit, or more plausi-
bly in a data center on an artificial island.  Equivalent-
ly, the data might be deliberately stored in a data cen-
ter in a rogue state with no MLATs.  In this case the 
data might be treated as if it had the citizenship corre-
sponding to the location of the service provider’s 
home office, simply to ensure that no service provider 
maneuvered for competitive advantage by seeking to 
establish stateless data. 
Data sovereignty tells us who is allowed to access 
data with an appropriate warrant.  For data with clear-
ly established citizenship, rights of data sovereignty 
are held by the country of the data’s citizenship.  The 
rights of sovereignty imply the application of that 
country’s rules for search.  MLATs can be negotiated.  
Additionally, given the ease with which cross border 
searches can be performed, countries may choose to 
extend the right of search to trusted allies, may choose 
to create expedited electronic MLATs (eMLATs), or 
may choose to leave traditional MLATs in place.  
When data are stateless, the rights of data sovereignty 
might be presumed to reside with the country where 
the service provider was located.  
8. In Conclusion 
Each of the four cases teaches us something dif-
ferent about privacy. 
The Apple iPhone.  The Apple iPhone dispute 
teaches us that there are indeed times when access to 
data may be urgently needed to avert an act of terror-
ism or other acts of mass violence.  The devices of 
suspects may be searched with an appropriate warrant, 
and cooperation from hardware or software vendors 
should be compelled under these limited circumstanc-
es.  
The Microsoft Email Warrant.  Microsoft’s 
dispute with the Department of Justice teaches us that 
whenever possible warrants for search of electronic 
documents should be consistent with the rules govern-
ing traditional search warrants.  When data has foreign 
citizenship and a foreign country exercises legitimate 
data sovereignty, warrants should be obtained from 
the country with sovereignty.   
The Google Email Warrant.  Google’s dispute 
with the FBI teaches us a lesson that is orthogonal to 
the lesson of the Microsoft case, but does not contra-
dict it in any way.  When documents are stored in such 
a way as to render them stateless, then international 
agreements and harmonized standards are required, if 
for no other reason than to preclude the tortured rea-
soning of the judge in this case.  Regardless of what 
agreements are eventually reached, when the home 
country of the service provider with control of the 
data, the home country of the individuals who own the 
data, and the location of the alleged offense that justi-
fied issuing of the initial warrant are all the same, then 
the warrant should be considered valid and the search 
should be allowed to proceed. 
The Facebook Warrant.  Finally, the Facebook 
search warrant case teaches us that it is too easy to 
demand anything and everything with an electronic 
search, without establishing in advance what you are 
seeking to find.  Warrants are not subpoenas and they 
cannot be contested or appealed to a higher court be-
fore complying.  They have traditionally required 
specification of what is being searched, what is being 
sought, and why.  This principle should be applied to 
warrants for the search of electronic media. 
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